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Protecting and Regulating Commercial
Speech: Consumers Confront the First
Amendment
By BARBARA A. BURNETr*
I
Introduction
Advertising' is a constant element in the American stream of
communication.2 The information and ideas it conveys are
central to the functioning of a private enterprise system.
3
While the pervasive influence of advertising has been the sub-
ject of economic, sociological and psychological study,4 com-
B.A., University of Kansas, 1969; J.D., New York University School of Law, 1972;
Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University, College of Law.
1. "Advertising is a tool of marketing for communicating ideas and information
about goods or services to a group; it employs paid space or time in the media or uses
another communication vehicle to carry its message; and it openly identifies the adver-
tiser and his relationship to the sales effort." S.M. ULANOFF, ADVERTISING IN AMERICA
17 (1977).
The change over the past ten years in the volume of advertising expenditure as a
percentage of the GNP roughly reflects the state of the economy. Advertising was
1.957% of the GNP in 1972. In 1973 the oil crisis and other recession conditions were
reflected in a sharply lower percentage, 1.883% for advertising. In 1976, after several
years of downward movement, advertising spending soared and the rate moved back
toward the 1972 figure. Total growth in the advertising industry is now estimated to
exceed the growth of the economy and may approach 10%. Forecasts for GNP growth
fall between 7% and 8%. Advertising as a percent of the GNP may rise to 2.2% for 1983.
Ad Industry Topped Others in Recession, AD AGE, May 30, 1983 at 3, 42. See also, S.W.
DUNN & A.M. BARBAN, ADVERTISING, ITS ROLE IN MODERN MARKETING 14-18 (1978).
2. Generally accepted advertising industry figures hold that the average person
in the United States is exposed to 50 to 200 advertising messages per day. This means
that by the time a person reaches maturity he or she has been subjected to between
one and two million advertising messages. C. GILSON & H. BERKMAN, ADVERTISING
CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES 3 (1980).
3. Advertising may be viewed as simply a response to consumer demand for
product information. See, Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729
(1974).
4. R. SCHIMALENSEE, THE ECONOMICS OF ADVERTISING (1972); B. TOLLEY, ADVER-
TISING AND MARKETING RESEARCH, A NEW METHODOLOGY (1977); J.M. FERGUSON, AD-
VERTISING AND COMPETITION; THEORY, MEASUREMENT, FACT (1974); A.T. POFFENBERGER,
PSYCHOLOGY IN ADVERTISING (2d ed. 1932); R.A. BAUER & S.A. GREYSER, ADVERTISING IN
AMERICA, THE CONSUMER VIEW (1968); J. BACKMAN, ADVERTISING AND COMPETITION
(1967).
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mercial speech' has only recently attracted the attention and
scrutiny of constitutional law scholars. 6 In this article the re-
cent extension of first amendment protection to commercial
speech is reviewed with an emphasis on the theoretical and an-
alytical substrata that support the unique degree of constitu-
tional scrutiny accorded regulatory legislation. This article
introduces and explains a new method of analyzing the adver-
tising message called functional analysis. Functional analysis
is a process of examining the various elements of a particular
message, primarily from the vantage point of the recipient and,
secondarily, from that of the speaker. Some of these elements
may serve commercial or selling purposes and some may have
noncommercial functions. Functional analysis is suggested as
a means for evaluating the constitutionality of advertising reg-
ulation. In addition, this method may be employed to promote
the further development of the first amendment values served
by commercial speech. Functional analysis is consistent with
5. Commercial speech has not been defined explicitly or with the kind of specific-
ity necessary for creating readily discernable categories of protected speech under the
first amendment. In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) the Court found a basic distinction grounded in "com-
monsense differences between speech that does 'no more than propose a commercial
transaction', . . . and other varieties." 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. In Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) commercial speech was limited
to communications which relate "solely to the economic interests of the speaker and
its audience," 447 U.S. at 561, or which do no more than propose a commercial transac-
tion. Id. at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also, Baker, infra note 6, at 42 n.146 and
Farber, infra note 6, at 371 n.1. Two commentators who have no difficulty with defini-
tion are Jackson and Jeffries, who defined commercial speech as "business advertising
that does no more than solicit a commercial transaction or state information relevant
thereto." Jackson & Jeffries, infra note 6, at 1. One leading theorist has combined defi-
nitional and policy determinants by arguing that "[ciommunications in connection
with commercial transactions generally relate to a separate sector of social activity
involving the system or property rights rather than free expression." EMERSON, To-
WARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 105 n.46 (1966).
6. See, e.g., Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62
IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976); Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1977);
Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L REV. 372 (1979);
Farber; Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View 68 GEo. L.J.
727 (1980); Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First
Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979); Meiklejohn, Commercial Speech and the First
Amendment, 13 CAL. W.L. REV. 430 (1977); Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and
Regulating Commercial Speech, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 437 (1980); Pitofsky, Beyond
Nadar: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV. L REV. 661
(1977); Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the
Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971); Rotunda, The Commercial
Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. IL. L.F. 1080; Roberts, Toward a Gen-
eral Theory of Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 115
(1979).
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and illuminates traditional free speech values while enhancing
the understanding of the components of advertising messages.
Advertising seeks to elicit an active response from the lis-
tener-the act of purchasing a good or service. Traditional first
amendment analysis has focused upon protecting the
speaker's right to convey information, express opinions and
promote ideas. Speech used for selling did not fit comfortably
in that structure until the court recognized that the needs and
rights of listeners were also served by the communication.'
Functional analysis is grounded in the proposition that listen-
ers who exercise individual choice in reading, hearing, assess-
ing, dismissing and sometimes acting upon commercial
solicitations are engaging in a form of self expression protected
by the first amendment free speech guarantee.8
7. See L. TwiBE, AMERICAN CONSnrrurONAL LAw 576-79 (1978).
No satisfactory jurisprudence of free speech can be built upon such partial
or compromised notions of the bases for expressional protection or the bound-
aries of the conduct to be protected. However tempting it may be to resist
governmental claims for restricting speech by retreating to an artificially nar-
rowed zone and then defending it without limit, any such course is likely in
the end to sacrifice too much to strategic maneuver: the claims for suppres-
sion will persist, and the defense will be no stronger for having withdrawn to
arbitrarily constricted territory. Any adequate conception of freedom of
speech must instead draw upon several strands of theory in order to protect a
rich variety of expressional modes.
Id. at 579.
See Neuborne, supra note 6, at 439 n.7 for a discussion of the focus on interests of the
hearer rather than the speaker in the first amendment writings of Justice Powell.
8. One voice from the advertising industry has expressed this notion of protected
self expression on the part of the listener in colorful terms:
The ensuing "remedies" make it clear that the staff really judges the value of a
mandatory disclaimer by the degree to which it changes consumer behavior in
the direction they are seeking.
But wait a minute, I'm a consumer, too. Who are they to be wondering what
to do with me next if I understand but choose to ignore some dumb disclaimer
they've forced an advertiser to put in his ad? It's my God-given right to ignore
any information any salesman presents me with-and an ad, remember, is a
salesman. And what's this about changing behavior? Well, mine is going to
change if the employees of a government I'm paying for start talking like that
out loud. It's going to get violent.
Later in the same document, the staff addresses "Sub-Optional Purchases."
While I have no quarrel with their intent, I find my hackles rising as they
define the problem in terms of people "misallocating resources," consumers
wasting their dollars on "products that do not best justify their needs." Listen,
fellows, those are my resources you're talking about. Those are my dollars,
what there is of them after you guys in Washington have had your way with
my paycheck. I'm going to allocate them as I damn well please. And if I want
to waste a few on products that do not best satisfy my needs-an unnutricious
but thoroughly delicious hot dog at the ball park, for example-try to stop me.
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The initial denial of first amendment protection to commer-
cial speech9 created an anomaly in constitutional theory.10 The
apparent creation of a content-based category of speech that
lacked traditional protection was ameliorated by the 1976 deci-
sion in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.," holding that commercial speech is
entitled to some degree of first amendment protection. That
decision did not, however, articulate a legal standard for distin-
guishing advertising which is protected from that which is
not.' 2 Neither the decisional law nor the commentaries has
produced a coherent test encompassing both traditional first
amendment doctrine and the specific constitutional values
served by commercial speech.'
3
The Supreme Court's 1980 decision in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,'4 adopted a four-
part test" for upholding commercial speech regulations. The
J. O'TOOLE, THE TROUBLE WITH ADVERTISING 23 (1981).
9. In a brief opinion the Supreme Court in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942), held that purely commercial speech was wholly unprotected by the first amend-
ment. The decision was later termed "casual, almost offhand" by Justice Douglas who
had joined in the unanimous decision. In his concurring opinion in Cammarano v.
United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), Justice Douglas admitted that the Valentine decision
had "not survived reflection." Id. at 513-14. Valentine was repeatedly questioned in
the years that followed: Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (holding
that an operation for profit does not strip film distributors of first amendment rights);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (upholding a newspaper's right to
publish a paid political advertisement); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (declining to overrule Valentine because the ad-
vertisement involved sex discrimination and was therefore illegal even if the first
amendment protected commercial speech); and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)
(reversing a newspaper editor's conviction for violating a Virginia statute by publish-
ing information about a New York abortion referral service because the advertised ac-
tivity related to the public's constitutional interests).
10. See Farber, supra note 6, at 372.
11. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
12. See TRIBE, supra note 7, at 655-56.
13. The developing commercial speech law follows a history of regulations aimed
at classes of speech such as obscenity, incitement and defamation. The unique socie-
tal values served by commercial communication place advertising in a position re-
quiring both protection and regulation.
14. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
15. In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At
the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the
First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at
least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly ad-
vances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more exten-
sive than is necessary to serve that interest.
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first step is to determine whether the first amendment even ap-
plies. For commercial speech to come within the scope of first
amendment protection it at least must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading. 6 Shortly thereafter, in In re R.M.J. 17
the Court, in evaluating professional service advertising regu-
lations, summarized the limits of constitutional protection for
commercial speech:
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to
the protections of the First Amendment. But when the particu-
lar content or method of the advertising suggests that it is in-
herently misleading or when experience has proven that in fact
such advertising is subject to abuse, the states may impose ap-
propriate restrictions. Misleading advertising may be prohib-
ited entirely. 18
This formulation also assumes that commercial speech can be
identified without definitional criteria. The Court intuitively
extended to commercial speech "a limited measure of protec-
tion, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale
of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regula-
tion that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommer-
cial expression."' 9
This labeling process does not distinguish the commercial
and noncommercial components of speech. The labels do not
in themselves justify the subordinate position of commercial
speech. For example, a court may properly determine that the
primary purpose of an advertisement for dairy products is to
propose a sales transaction. To label that message purely com-
mercial may obscure other elements of that speech. For exam-
ple, the advertisement might include information concerning
the health benefits to be derived from an adequate supply of
calcium in one's diet. These components of the commercial
message do more than sell goods; they convey ideas and thus
serve first amendment values common to all forms of protected
speech.2°
The functional analysis approach provides a method of rec-
onciling the paradox created by extending constitutional pro-
Id. at 566.
16. Id.
17. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
18. Id. at 937.
19. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
20. Kushner, Freedom to Hear: The First Amendment, Commercial Speech and Ac-
cess to Information, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 137, 173-76 (1981).
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tection to a form of speech that sometimes requires regulation
because it is demonstrably harmful to the interests of its audi-
ence. False and deceptive speech is not protected speech. The
regulatory challenge is to demonstrate the capacity of a given
message to deceive. Functional analysis subdivides commer-
cial messages into two categories: statements that are objec-
tive or verifiable and statements that are subjective or
unverifiable. Within those two categories a more fine-tuned
analysis of the free speech values to be served by the advertis-
ing information is made. The usual context for such an analy-
sis is a challenge to a government regulation which seeks to
prohibit or control the information conveyed. Where the infor-
mation is verifiable, regulation should be permitted only when
the content is shown to be false. Where the message is subjec-
tive, a much stronger governmental interest must be estab-
lished to uphold any restriction on the content of the speech.
In this area the results of empirical studies should aid in deter-
mining when inherently unverifiable speech is so harmful as to
justify regulation. The findings of marketing studies, con-
sumer behavior research, and economic modeling support the
functional analysis approach which illuminates the multiple
dimensions of commercial speech.
Commercial speech doctrine must be reconciled with basic
first amendment theory for several reasons. First, future deci-
sions concerning political speech may permit lesser levels of
protection by permitting the restriction of speech based on
content.21 The standard of protection for all forms of speech
may be lowered by the introduction of this unique category of
speech.22 On the other hand, failure to assimilate commercial
speech into the existing constitutional theory could result in
the eventual demise of its protected status.23 Conversely, com-
mercial speech could be given greater protection than political
speech.24
Functional analysis would assure full access to needed infor-
mation while permitting regulation designed to control false
and deceptive advertising.2 This article proposes a standard
21. See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 6, at 8.
22. See Roberts, supra note 6, at 115-16; Neuborne, supra note 6, at 439 n.7.
23. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 630 (1982).
24. See Neuborne, supra note 6, at 440.
25. The primary governmental regulator of advertising practice is the Federal
Trade Commission. 'The Commission is empowered and directed to prevent persons,
partnerships or corporations. . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affect-
[Vol. 5
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
for distinguishing protected from unprotected commercial
speech; a standard which takes into account both the nature of
the advertiser's message and the consumer's potential use of
that information. Functional analysis acknowledges the diver-
sity of information in advertisements and provides a founda-
tion -for the reconciliation of developing commercial speech
doctrine with traditional first amendment theory.
II
The Test for Determining Permissible Regulation
of Commercial Speech Must Include the
Functional Analysis
A. The Central Hudson/R.M.J Test
The test set forth in Central Hudson and R.M.J. 2 6 for deter-
mining whether advertising regulation is constitutionally per-
missible does not include any analysis of the speech
components. Advertising is usually distinguishable from the
philosophical or political exchange essential to the democratic
process (i.e., core speech)." However, similarities between
ing commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2) (1915). See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-
58 (1980). The Commission's discretion in deceptive advertising cases has been virtu-
ally unquestioned. See Note, Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80
HARv. L. REV. 1005 (1967). The development of a constitutional standard for protecting
commercial speech may generate increased judicial scrutiny of Commission determi-
nations that commercial speech is deceptive and thus subject to regulation or restric-
tion. See Comment, FTC Deceptive Advertising Regulation: A Proposal for the Use of
Consumer Behavior Research, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 946 (1982).
26. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
27. First amendment protection has been extended beyond political dialogue to
include "philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters." Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977). See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973) (affording protection to works with "serious literary, artistic, political or scien-
tific value"); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) stating that the first amend-
ment protects "the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes. .. ").
The substantive underpinnings of the first amendment have been the subject of
much theorizing, most of which includes arguments that protection should include
more than political speech. See, e.g., Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 964 (1978); BeVier, The First Amendment and Political
Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, STAN. L. REV. 299
(1978) (Professor BeVier identifies "pragmatic concerns and institutional limitations"
to expand the reach of protection beyond the purely political. Id. at 322); BeVier, Jus-
tice Powell and the First Amendment's "Societal Function": A Preliminary Analysis,
68 VA. L. REV. 177 (1982). Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977
AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521; Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a
Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974); Redish, The Value of
No. 41
COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 5
core speech and commercial speech have been noted by schol-
ars who argue that a rigid separation of the market for ideas
and the market for goods is no longer supportable.28 The juris-
prudence of commercial speech has reached the point in its de-
velopment where a standard for permissible regulation must
be incorporated into the analytical framework provided by
Central Hudson and R.M.J.
Neither Central Hudson nor R.M.J. include a definition of
commercial speech which justifies the lesser degree of consti-
tutional protection it is accorded. Because the Supreme Court
has yet to define commercial speech,29 a clear standard for as-
sessing the degree of protection a particular commercial
message may merit has not emerged. The analysis provided
by the Court of the importance and function of commercial
speech is sketchy and incomplete.3 0 The Court extends a lim-
Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982). See also Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
28. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 6, at 441; Coase, supra note 6, at 4 ("There is
simply no reason to suppose that for the great mass of people the market for ideas is
more important than the market for goods.").
29. For a discussion of the similarity between defining and categorizing, see text
accompanying notes 113-17. Legal language tends to be technical and content depen-
dent; the language of constitutional dialogue is especially susceptible to confusion
with everyday usage in which terms like advertising and commercial speech are not
interchangeable. See, Chafee, The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COLUM. L REv. 381,
395 (1941); Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 LAw. Q. REV. 37 (1954).
30. The Court's failure to explore the unique attributes of commercial speech re-
flects a larger controversy in the interpretation of the scope of first amendment protec-
tion. Scholars disagree as to whether the constitutional right to freedom of expression
is absolute or whether a balancing of competing interests in free speech and govern-
ment regulation is necessary. By defining certain categories of speech as unprotected,
the Court has allowed a governmental showing of compelling state interest and ra-
tional relation of a regulation to that objective. See TRIBE, supra note 7, at 602-08. The
absolutists contend that the process of defining rather than balancing better supports
the preferred position freedom of expression enjoys under the Constitution. See
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 914
(1963). The process should include methods bywhich courts can express this constitu-
tionally mandated preference for freedom of speech by strictly construing statutes,
narrowing the presumption of validity of legislative acts and proposing higher stan-
dards of procedural due process. See McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1182, 1190-93 (1959).
Professor Tribe assesses the government's restrictions on speech in two ways. First,
the regulation may be directed at the content of the speech, the information and ideas
it conveys. The goal of such content regulation is to regulate the "communicative im-
pact" of the speech. Second, the government may restrict the flow of information indi-
rectly because it is pursuing other goals. The regulation is not aimed at
communicative impact but nevertheless abridges speech because it restricts communi-
cation. In the first situation, the regulation aimed at the content of the speech must be
invalidated unless the government can show a compelling interest or unless the ex-
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ited measure of constitutional protection to commercial speech
"commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of
First Amendment values."'" A precise scale for first amend-
ment values has not been described in any of the Supreme
Court decisions.32
While regulation may be needed in some circumstances, the
decisions do not address governmental restrictions on com-
mercial speech with a consistent focus on the first amendment
values to be preserved. Merely giving deference to governmen-
tal decisions about the likelihood of harm to the listener could
easily result in a level of first amendment protection for com-
mercial speech that is ephemeral at best. Where distinctions
must be made between "core" and "commercial"33 speech,
some unifying standard must be developed. The standard of-
fered in this article is based on a threshold determination that
speech classified as commercial may be divided into two types,
verifiable and unverifiable messages. Verifiable messages may
be true or false. False messages concerning the sales of goods
or services are not protected speech. Inherently unverifiable
messages belong in the realm of ideas and even though they
may pertain to products or services, first amendment protec-
tion should be extended until the likelihood of harm to the lis-
tener is established. Thus, the definitional problem is
ameliorated and an analysis of first amendment values to be
served by protected speech may be made.
pressive activity falls within one of the narrowly drawn categories of excepted speech.
TRIBE, supra note 7, at 602-08. When the second situation obtains and the regulation
has only the incidental effect of restricting information, the government's rational jus-
tifications for the regulation and the free speech values restricted must be balanced.
Id., at 682-88. Professor Tribe suggests that any exclusion of a class of activities from
first amendment safeguards represents an implicit conclusion that the governmental
interests in regulating those activities are such as to justify whatever limitation is
placed on the free expression of ideas. "Thus, determinations of the reach of first
amendment protections on either track presuppose some form of 'balancing' whether
or not they appear to do so. The question is whether the 'balance' should be struck for
all cases in the process of framing particular categorical definitions or whether the
balance should be calibrated anew on a case-by-case basis." Id., at 583.
31. 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
32. See Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L.
REV. 107, 139-40 (1982) which suggests a hierarchy based on subject matter.
33. Still, maintaining some residual distinctions between commercial and ide-
ological expression on the ground that the former is valued only for the 'facts'
it conveys while the latter 'is integrally related to the exposition of thought-
thought that may shape our concepts of the whole universe of man', may be
more likely to succeed than did Chrestensen itself.
TRIBE, supra note 7, at 655.
No. 4]
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The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has promulgated
standards for government intervention in the communication
of information to consumers. 4 The FTC regulations tend to be
responses to specific problems rather than a comprehensive
set of principles for determining when and how federal inter-
vention should be effected." In some instances, the FTC,
under its authority to prevent "unfair" acts or practices,36 may
require disclosure of certain information. This authority has
been extended on the basis of vague determinations that the
practices in question cause "substantial injury to consumers"
or are "oppressive or unscrupulous."37 The difficulty created
by the lack of a legal standard for fairness 38 is now exacerbated
by the need for a constitutional analysis of the function of com-
mercial speech. The limits of the FTC's authority are now de-
fined by a first amendment interpretation which is, at best,
incomplete and, at worst, episodic and confusing. The first
amendment standards for evaluating government regulation
are presently too vague to be useful.
1. Major Supreme Court Decisions on Commercial Speech
Supreme Court decisions extending first amendment protec-
tion to commercial speech have focused upon the importance
of accurate information to the listener. The decisions provide
little guidance for determining when protection of truthful or
inherently unverifiable commercial speech may be curtailed
and regulated. In addition, the decisions label communica-
tions "commercial" without analyzing the components of the
speech or the needs of listeners and speakers they may serve.
The discussion which follows focuses upon several major deci-
34. See e.g., Trade Regulation Rule, Labeling and Advertising of Home Insulation,
16 C.F.R. § 460 (1980) and Trade Regulation Rule, Care Labeling of Textile Wearing
Apparel, 16 C.F.R. § 423 (1980).
35. See, Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Ba.is of Imperfect Infor-
mation: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1980).
37. FTC v. Sperry Hutchinson Co. 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972). See also Statement
of Basis and Purpose, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising of Cigarettes in Relation to the
Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (1964); Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d
287, 293 (7th Cir. 1976).
38. Schwartz, Regulating Unfair Practices under the FTC Act: The Need for a Le-
gal Standard of Unfairness, 11 AKRON L. REV. 1 (1977). It is legally sufficient for the
FTC to find, on the basis of its own observations, that an advertisement has the capac-
ity to cause consumers to form an inaccurate opinion. Gellhorn, Proof of Consumer
Deception before the Federal Trade Commission 17 U. KAN. L. REV. 559 (1969).
[Vol. 5
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sions that illustrate the need for a functional analysis of com-
mercial speech.
Commercial speech was first accorded first amendment pro-
tection in the 1976 case of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.39 In this case the
Court focused on the need for free flow of commercial informa-
tion. ° The Court had earlier denied constitutional protection
for commercial speech in the 1942 decision Valentine v.
Chrestensen ,41 a four-page opinion upholding a ban on leaflet-
ing. In Chrestensen, the Court offered no rationale for its dis-
tinction between commercial and political speech, on which its
denial of first amendment protection was based. The freedom
to communicate opinions and disseminate information was as-
sumed to be quite distinct from the pursuit of a gainful occupa-
tion.42 At that time, the Court focused upon the commercial or
business conduct prohibited by the regulation rather than on
the speech or communication activity it impaired.43  The
Chrestensen decision suggests that the Court viewed the ordi-
nance in question as a business regulation promulgated by a
local lawmaking process deserving of great deference," not as
a limitation on an individual's first amendment right to speak.
The Court did not deal with the constitutionality of the ordi-
nance as it was applied, but looked only to the stated purpose
for the regulation. The impact of the regulation on communi-
cation was not considered.
More than twenty years after Chrestensen the Court, in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan45 again defined first amendment
speech by labeling rather than analyzing the advertising
message. Finding that a paid political advertisement merited
39. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
40. Id. at 765.
41. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
42. Id. at 54.
43. Id. at 55.
44. At the time of the Chrestensen decision the Court had implicitly rejected the
notion that the Constitution could be stretched to protect economic due process.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). Thus the handbill ordinance could be upheld
even though it might have some incidental adverse effect on an individual's pursuit of
economic gain. See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An
Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 34; Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alterna-
tive Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARv. L REV. 1463 (1967). Critics of the
commercial speech doctrine argue that it signals a return to the repudiated economic
due process decisions by protecting entrepreneurs from government interference. See
Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 5, at 30-34. See TRnmE, supra note 7, at 438.
45. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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first amendment protection, the Court distinguished the adver-
tisement at issue from the unprotected commercial message
by labeling it ideological fundraising speech.46 The element of
solicitation in the advertisement supporting Martin Luther
King was found to be insubstantial when compared with its
political content and, thus, it was "not a 'commercial' adver-
tisement in the sense in which the word was used in Chresten-
sen."47 The advertisement in Sullivan, unlike that in
Chrestensen, "communicated information, expressed opinion,
recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought
financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence
and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and
concern."4 8 That the public might have as great an interest in
the existence and objectives of an electrical utility,49 a legal
clinic, ° or a health facility51 seems at least arguable even
though messages advertising those enterprises might not be
predominantly political or ideological. The Court hinted that
the public concern, and the public need or desire to know,
might be determinative, but the Court did not further explore
the utility or the implications of the labels it employed. Appar-
ently, when ideological speech is involved the Court employs
different values to interpret the first amendment. Those values
have yet to be advanced as a principle basis for extending pro-
tection to commercial speech while according it treatment dif-
ferent from other protected speech.
The first amendment values served by commercial speech
should determine the degree of judicial scrutiny to be given
commercial speech regulation. These values are suggested in
the decisions beginning in 1975 with Bigelow v. Virginia,52 a
case involving an advertisement for abortion counseling serv-
ices in New York, published in a Virginia newspaper. For the
first time the Court questioned the viability of the commercial
speech exception and ventured a partial analysis of the con-
tent of an advertisement. The majority opinion announced
that speech is not beyond constitutional protection merely be-
cause it is commercial in form or related to commercial activ-
46. Id. at 266.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557.
50. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).




ity. However, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,
distinguished rather than overruled Chrestensen by character-
izing it as involving a reasonable regulation of the manner of
distributional commercial advertising. Thus Chrestensen was
reinterpreted as holding that advertising is not unprotected per
se.3 The majority adopted a balancing test and held that the
public interest in the free flow of speech outweighed the state's
need for regulation. Since abortion was a matter of great pub-
lic concern, the Court reasoned that the advertisement be-
longed at least partially to the marketplace of ideas as well as
to the marketplace for goods and services.5 " In addition, the
activity underlying the advertisement was legal.
Bigelow thus enunciated two independent and alternative
grounds for prohibiting commercial speech regulation: public
importance of the subject matter and legality of the activity be-
ing advertised. Earlier, in a 1973 decision, Pittsburgh Press Co.
v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations ,5 in which
neither of these independent and alternative grounds were
present, the Court upheld commercial speech regulation. In
Pittsburgh Press the Court upheld a state law prohibiting sex-
designated help-wanted advertisements. The Court indicated
that if the advertisement in Pittsburgh Press had done "more
than propose a commercial transaction, ' 56 or if the activity ad-
vertised had been legal, a more rigorous balancing test would
have been required. Thus, even though the Court did not elab-
orate on "the precise extent to which the First Amendment
permits regulation of advertising that is related to activities the
State may legitimately regulate or even prohibit, '5 7 it did
weaken the commercial speech exception.
In 1976, the Court, in Virginia Pharmacy,58 faced the ques-
tion of whether commercial speech was protected by the first
amendment. The Court examined the constitutionality of a
prohibition on advertising prescription drug prices. While the
Bigelow decision stressed that the advertisement in question
53. Id. at 819-20. In 1976 the New York Court of Appeals, on the basis of Virginia
Pharmacy, held unconstitutional the same New York City ordinance which the
Supreme Court had upheld in Chrestensen. People v. Remeny, 40 N.Y.2d 527, 355
N.E.2d 375, 387 N.Y.S,2d 415 (1976).
54. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822.
55. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
56. Id. at 385.
57. Id. at 388.
58. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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did more than simply "propose a commercial transaction" 9 be-
cause it contained factual information of clear public interest,
the advertisements in Virginia Pharmacy were purely com-
mercial. Thus, there was still a "fragment of hope" for the
Chrestensen doctrine even though the rule had "all but passed
from the scene"6 with the Bigelow decision. While Bigelow
and a few earlier cases61 had suggested that speech, by virtue
of appearing in an advertisement or involving sales, does not
lose its first amendment protection, the Supreme Court had
never confronted the question of protecting purely commercial
speech, such as price information, until Virginia Pharmacy.
To determine whether purely commercial information merited
the same protection as the ideas and information in Bigelow
and New York Times, the Court analyzed the interests of the
consumers and those of the regulators. The Court found that
the public has a strong interest in the unfettered dissemination
of purely commercial information because such information is
"indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free
enterprise system."62 In addition, fully available commercial
information is necessary to the "formation of intelligent opin-
ions as to how that system ought to be regulated ... ."63
The Court, in Virginia Pharmacy, nevertheless character-
ized commercial speech as unique, requiring a different meas-
ure of protection than other forms of speech. Commercial
speech is different from other forms of speech in two respects:
advertising is more easily verifiable than news or political com-
mentary, and it is less easily chilled because it is motivated by
a desire for profit.' The Court also noted that, in addition to
this less vulnerable, more verifiable aspect, advertisers do not
face the difficulties of the press, "which must often attempt to
assemble the true facts from sketchy and sometimes conflict-
59. Id. at 762.
60. Id. at 759.
61. The decision in Pittsburgh Press suggested that a degree of first amendment
protection for commercial speech existed. See 413 U.S. at 384-85. In Lehman v. City of
Shaker Hghts., 418 U.S. 298 (1974), four members of the Court suggested that commer-
cial speech was protected. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936),
which held a license tax on advertising revenues of newspapers unconstitutional. In
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson 343 U.S. 495 (1952), the commercial promotion of a mo-
tion picture was protected. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), the door-
to-door sales of religious pamphlets was protected.
62. 425 U.S. at 765.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 771 n.24.
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ing sources under the pressure of publication
deadlines . . 6
The Court's assumption about the verifiability of information
in advertising is overbroad and incomplete. The verifiability of
claims in advertising is not a static phenomenon. Some types
of claims may be more or less readily verified. Other kinds of
advertising messages are not verifiable by nature.66 Commer-
cial speech, as often as political speech, may consist of ideas
that serve as a basis for economic decision-making, about
which it may be said "there is no such thing as a false idea."67
Stringent regulation of commercial speech may result in a
proliferation of unverifiable statements, thus depriving poten-
tial consumers of the very information necessary to informed
decision-making. Thus, commercial speech is often not as
hardy as the Court asserts. Accordingly, fear of regulation may
not result in a cessation of advertising, but may instead detri-
mentally affect the nature and quality of information given to
the listener through advertisements. Controversial questions
may not be raised and listeners may be deprived of an opportu-
nity to make fully informed decisions.
Current efforts to determine the proper scope of protection
and the degree of permissible regulation have not explored the
public interest in the content of a commercial message. Some
advertisements for commercial services lack the verifiability of
promotions for standard consumer goods. Thus, for example,
some types of service advertisements convey very little infor-
mation but rather seek to attract customers based on the ambi-
ance of the establishment rather than on the quality of the
service. Arguably, image advertising does not have the quality
of verifiability that justifies a lower level of first amendment
protection. It is, however, somewhat counterintuitive to de-
clare that a radio spot that exhorts listeners to "Experience
Heavy Haircutters," deserves the same level of protection from
regulation as a radio message of a candidate for political office
on the grounds that neither contains objectively verifiable in-
formation. Verifiability has contradictory implications. While
less objectively verifiable messages are more vulnerable to the
65. Id. at 777 (Stewart, J., concurring).
66. The terms objective and subjective are often used in place of verifiable and
inherently unverifiable. THORELu, BECKER & ENGLEDOW, THE INFORMATION SEEKERS
203-04 (1975).
67. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
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"chilling effect," they also have a greater potential to mislead
consumers. In some circumstances, therefore, government
regulation would be permissible.
The Court confronted this contradiction almost immediately
after Virginia Pharmacy with its 1977 decision, Bates v. State
Bar,68 a case involving lawyer advertising. The Court held that
a state may not prohibit the advertisement of the prices of rou-
tine legal services. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,
declared that the result in Bates could be said "to flow a forti-
ori"69 from the Virginia Pharmacy decision. The analysis in
Bates of the interests of the public and the interests of listen-
ers was largely economic and as such, was often "keener than
... concern for urgent political dialogue. 7 ° Thus the informa-
tional function of advertising was found to require constitu-
tional protection for the information in the advertisement. At
the same time, the Court acknowledged the need to protect lis-
teners from misleading statements, suggesting that "because
the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services"' 71 the
test for deceptive advertising might be stricter for lawyers,
even in the case of routine legal services. Earlier in the opin-
ion, however, the Court rejected both the assumption that the
public was not discerning and that the imposition of regulation
would have the effect of keeping the public in ignorance. 72 The
proper balance between permitting discourse and protecting
vulnerable listeners must be sought. The balancing of the
state interest in regulation and the consumer interest in infor-
mation requires a test that recognizes the "common sense" dif-
ferences between commercial and noncommercial speech.
Both Virginia Pharmacy and Bates alluded to these differ-
ences using the terms "durability" and "verifiability." First,
one asserted premise was that advertising serves the economic
well-being of both the speaker and the listener; therefore over-
broad regulation is less likely to have a chilling effect on the
advertiser. Commercial speech is thus more "durable." In ad-
dition, since advertisers are most familiar with their products
and services and know the truthfulness of their advertise-
ments, there is less need to protect their speech from over-
68. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
69. Id. at 365.
70. Id. at 364.
71. Id. at 383.
72. Id. at 365.
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broad regulations. Both of these justifications for reduced first
amendment protection fail because commercial speech which
is in fact less "verifiable" and less "durable" will not receive
more protection but will be subject to greater regulation and
less protection. For instance, a lawyer touting the quality of
his service makes a less "durable" and less "verifiable" claim
than one who advertises only the price of his services. The first
lawyer would be subject to more, not less, regulation according
to the Bates Court.73 Both the interest of the speaker and the
interest of the listener may be broadly characterized as an in-
terest in having the widest possible exposure to accurate data
for making individual assessments of truth.
The decision in Central Hudson 74 reaffirmed the level of con-
stitutional protection accorded commercial speech, but left
unexamined the values underlying that protection. Instead, it
introduced a four part test 75 as a means of evaluating the pro-
cess and the impact of regulation. The decision focused on the
need to devise a tool for limiting legislative efforts to regulate
economic activity for the public benefit. Recognizing that com-
mercial speech has the potential for both benefitting and bur-
dening the consumer, the Court's test purports to
accommodate the conflicting or potentially conflicting interests
of speaker and listener. While recognizing that "expression re-
lated solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience '76 may serve to educate, inform and even enlighten,
the Court acknowledged the potential of such expressions to
mislead and to deceive. The four part test addresses the ten-
sion between the needs of the listener and the needs of the
speaker.
Central Hudson struck down a ban on advertising designed
73. See id.
74. 447 U.S. 557.
75. Id. at 566. See supra note 15. This test resembles an earlier four part test for
balancing governmental and individual interests first enunciated in United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Young v. Amer-
ican Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 79-80 (1976) employs the O'Brien test as follows:
[G]overnment regulation is sufficiently justified, despite its incidental im-
pact upon First Amendment interests, 'if it is within the constitutional power
of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental in-
terest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free ex-
pression; and if the incidental restriction on ... First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.'
quoting U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,377 (1968).
76. 447 U.S. at 561.
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to promote use of electricity, even though the purpose of the
regulation was to benefit the public by encouraging energy
conservation. The Court acknowledged the speaker's interest
as well as the needs of the listener. The balance was struck in
favor of the listener's need to know. The basis for the decision
was the failure of the regulatory agency to sufficiently define
the scope of the regulation.
The four steps set out by the Court begin with a beguilingly
simple directive. First, "determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment."77 The expression must
concern lawful activity and must not be misleading.78 Second,
determine "whether the asserted governmental interest is sub-
stantial."79 If the answers to both inquiries are positive, the
third step is to determine "whether the regulation directly ad-
vances the governmental interest asserted."8 The final deter-
mination is whether the regulation is "more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest. ' 81 Each of these steps re-
quires a more fine-tuned analysis than its brevity might
indicate.
In deciding Central Hudson the Court had no difficulty with
the first two steps. The regulated speech was not alleged to be
unlawful or misleading by the Commission.82 The Court recog-
nized a substantial state interest in energy conservation and
found that the regulation directly advanced that interest. The
fourth test, however, was not met.83 The Court found that the
regulation was broader than necessary to accomplish its stated
purpose. The general ban on advertising by public utilities
could encompass advertising designed solely to promote the
use of electricity over other less efficient energy sources. Thus,
the governmental interest in promoting energy conservation
might actually be harmed. The Court held that the complete
suppression of the electric company's advertising would not be
allowed absent a showing that more limited speech regulation
would be ineffective.
The first part of the Central Hudson test glosses over the pri-
mary question, namely, how commercial speech is initially to






83. Id. at 570.
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be defined. Part one of the test asks only whether the expres-
sion at issue falls into the category of protected commercial
speech or whether it is false or misleading advertising and
therefore unprotected. The answer to that question is not al-
ways immediately apparent and is often not as easily discover-
able as the Court implied in Central Hudson. While the four
part test is consistent with broad notions of traditional first
amendment doctrine, 84 it leaves important questions unan-
swered. Some commercial messages contain elements of pol-
icy or political dialogue. Others are purely factual and
verifiable. Sometimes there are several messages, several
levels of fact and opinion, and also emotive or persuasive con-
tent. It is often difficult to draw the line between what is mis-
leading and what is simply the presentation of a product or
service in the best light. In the ambiguous situation, where
fact and exaggeration may be combined, a detailed analysis is
needed of both the role of commercial speech in light of tradi-
tional first amendment values and of the circumstances which
justify diminished protection. The Central Hudson test does
not provide a method or a foundation for such analysis.
In its most recent decision concerning commercial speech
regulation, In re R. M. J. ,85 the Court again avoided setting stan-
dards for permissible regulation of commercial speech. An at-
torney practicing in Missouri challenged the interpretation of
the rules of that state's Committee on Professional Ethics and
Responsibility which limited the type of information attorneys
could publish in advertisements. Specifically, areas of practice
in which the advertiser might specialize had to be indicated by
the use of certain prescribed terms. 6 The appellant mailed
professional announcement cards using terms not listed in the
rules and failed to disclaim specialization. In a disbarment
proceeding, the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the consti-
tutionality of the rule.87
The Supreme Court reversed the Missouri court holding that
the rule was more extensive than the governmental interest it
purported to serve required.8 8 The Court reviewed its earlier
84. Theorists rarely rely on historical evidence of the intent of the framers of the
constitution. See Bork, supra note 27, at 22.
85. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
86. For example, the term "property law" could be used but "real estate" could
not.
87. 609 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. 1981).
88. 455 U.S. at 207.
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holding in Bates 89 and summarized the commercial speech
doctrine in the context of advertising professional services as
follows:
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to
the protections of the First Amendment. But when the particu-
lar content or method of the advertising suggests that it is in-
herently misleading or when experience has proven that in fact
such advertising is subject to abuse, the states may impose ap-
propriate restrictions. Misleading advertising may be prohib-
ited entirely. But the states may not place an absolute
prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading informa-
tion, e.g., a listing of areas of practice, if the information also
may be presented in a way that is not deceptive .... Although
the potential for deception and confusion is particularly strong
in the context of advertising professional services, restrictions
upon such advertising may be no broader than reasonably nec-
essary to prevent the deception.
90
The Court suggested that the potential for misleading con-
sumers might not be the only justification for regulation. The
state retains power to regulate even when a communication is
not misleading. However, the state must assert a substantial
interest and the interference must be no more extensive than
is necessary to serve that interest.91 Whether the state or the
federal government can establish such interests and can then
fashion legislation to suit precisely those interests remains to
be seen.92
89. Id. at 935. Price advertising was held not to be inherently misleading. How-
ever, Bates emphasized that advertising by lawyers was still susceptible to regulation
because "the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services, misstatements that
might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other advertising may be found quite
inappropriate in legal advertising." 433 U.S. at 383 (footnote omitted).
90. 455 U.S. at 203.
91. Id. 203-04.
92. Since R.M.J. several state courts have considered lawyer advertising and solici-
tation regulations. State v. Moses, 231 Kan. 243, 642 P.2d 1004 (1982) (upholding cen-
sure of attorney who used direct mail solicitation); McLellan v. State Bar Ass'n, 413
So.2d 705 (Miss. 1982) (blanket prohibition of advertising in Yellow Pages struck
down); In re State Bar Petition for Approval of Changes in Disciplinary Rules on Ad-
vertising, 647 P.2d 991 (Utah 1982) (proposed amendment to state disciplinary rules
was not approved because its direct mailing prohibition was too sweeping).
See, L. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLIcITATION
(1980); Brosnahan and Andrews, Regulation of Lawyer Advertising: In the Public In-
terest? 46 BROOKLYN L. REv. 423 (1980); Note, Three Years Later. State Court Interpre-
tations of the Attorney's Right to Advertise and the Public's Right to Information, 45
Mo. L. REV. 562 (1980); Martineau, The Supreme Court and State Regulation of the Le-
gal Profession, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 199 (1981); Note, Mail Advertising by Attorneys
and the First Amendment, 46 ALBAN L. REV. 250 (1981).
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The decisions developing the commercial speech doctrine
have failed to articulate a workable distinction between "core"
speech and "commercial" speech. Labeling has been substi-
tuted for analysis of the values served by commercial speech.
The Central Hudson test for verifying commercial speech regu-
lation does not include any framework for evaluating the func-
tion of the advertising message. This discussion of the
doctrinal development has elucidated the need for a test which
encompasses first amendment values and an understanding of
the functioning of advertising messages.
2. The First Amendment Values Served by Commercial
Speech
The inclusion of commercial speech in first amendment the-
ory requires a broader scope of analysis than has been tradi-
tionally applied. Consistent with a more broadly based
analysis is the position that the central value93 underlying first
amendment protection of speech is the promotion and protec-
tion of the search for an individual truth.94 The primary pur-
pose for protecting speech is not to attain a universal truth but
to protect each citizen's quest for personal development and
attainment of his own truths. When the focus of analysis is di-
rected to the listeners as well as to the speaker, the values un-
derlying the protection are clarified. The freedom to hear" as
well as the freedom to speak fosters personal development,
aids in decision-making and makes possible the full realization
of human faculties. The goal is largely intangible but no less
central to the functioning of a democracy. In an early discus-
sion of commercial speech Professor Martin Redish96 illus-
trated the self-realization value of affording the listener the
freedom to hear:
When the individual is presented with rational grounds for pre-
ferring one product or brand over another, he is encouraged to
consider the competing information, weigh it mentally in the
93. In a recent comment the four basic values underlying protection of expression
are set forth as political self-government, self realization through expression, discov-
ery of truth and individual growth through perception. Commercial speech may incor-
porate any and all such values depending upon the form, content and positioning of
the communication. Note, Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 720 (1982).
94. See Redish, supra note 23, at 593.
95. See Kushner, supra note 20.
96. Redish, supra note 23, at 593. See also Redish, supra note 6.
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light of the goals of personal satisfaction he has set for himself,
counter-balance his conclusions with possible price differen-
tials, and in so doing exercise his abilities to reason and think:
this aids him towards the intangible goal of rational self-
fulfillment.97
More recently, Professor Redish added that recognizing the in-
dividual's unencumbered right to make life-affecting decisions
precludes any determination by external bodies that certain
grounds for making decisions are preferable to others.98 This
argument, however, does not apply to false information. The
troublesome necessity to distinguish between what is false and
what is misleading is a subtle problem apprehending complex-
ities of language and thought. The uncertainty surrounding
the ways in which a listener may be misled and the methods
by which regulatory decisions are made go to the heart of the
self-realization value of free speech.99
The Court has emphasized the information function of com-
mercial speech. 100 The potential for informing consumers and
generating discussion of economic issues has been recognized
as sufficiently important to deserve some degree' 01 of constitu-
tional protection. The notion that listeners have an interest in
hearing the message is the starting point for the development
of an analytical framework which examines the nature and
utility of the advertising message. Commercial speech is pro-
97. Redish, supra note 6, at 443-44.
98. Redish, supra note 23, at 630.
99. The interest of the listener received notice first in the religious and political
sphere. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (the right to receive and
read birth control literature); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (the right to hear speech concerning labor organizing);
and Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (the need for the public to be informed
about significant current issues). The interest of the listener extends to the exercise of
personal judgment concerning the ideas and information communicated. The notion
that governmental determinations of what is relevant, non-deceptive communication
are appropriate requires careful scrutiny once first amendment protection is granted
to commercial speech. See, Comment, FTC Deceptive Advertising Regulation: A Pro-
posal for the Use of Consumer Behavior Research, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 946 (1982).
100. "[Commercial] speech serves individual and societal interests in assuring in-
formed and reliable decision-making." Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364
(1977).
101. While the degree of protection is not specified, the burden of proof has been
upon the speaker of commercial messages to demonstrate that the particular commu-
nication merits protection. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10-11 n.9 (1979). The as-
sumption is that regulation of core speech is unconstitutional. Any such regulation
must survive "strict" scrutiny. "The interest advanced must be paramount... and the
burden is on the government to show the existence of such an interest." Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976) (citation omitted).
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tected 10 2 speech, in part, because the interests of the listeners
are as significant as those of the speaker.
Functional analysis requires an expansion of the traditional
first amendment emphasis on the contribution of free speech
to the functioning of democratic institutions and political dia-
logue. 10 3 A broader first amendment interpretation is required
to justify protecting information that may have only the effect
of allocating goods and services in the marketplace. This line
of reasoning requires, however, that the first amendment be in-
terpreted to contain some commitment to laissez-faire eco-
nomic organization. Such an interpretation conflicts with the
rejection of economic due process in the 1930's.1°4 The distinc-
tion between speech in the marketplace of ideas and speech in
the marketplace for goods does not withstand scrutiny, 0 5 and
the basis for making distinctions between categories of speech
does not lie in the labels "trade" and "politics." To some, the
importance of the decision-making process is as great in the
choice of an automobile as in the choice of a mayor.
Functional analysis begins with a close examination of the
needs of the listener. The scope and variety of the listener's
interests is potentially vast. By beginning the analysis with
the listener, the potential consumer, the court must necessar-
ily engage in some inquiry as to the content of the commercial
expression. This inquiry should not be mistaken for content
regulation. 06 The analysis of content is not for the purpose of
102. The distinction between "protected" speech and "covered" speech in the first
amendment context is recognized by Professor Schauer central to the definitional
issue:
If we do say that all of these cases are covered by the first amendment, we
then must have a way of holding that these activities are not protected by the
first amendment unless of course we want to say that the first amendment
makes, for example all of contract law, most of antitrust law and most of crimi-
nal law unconstitutional.
Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV.
265, 270 (1981). Some commercial speech may therefore be covered by the first amend-
ment but not protected or not as protected as other forms of speech.
103. See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 6.
104. See id. at 31 n.109.
105. See, Fuchsberg, Commercial Speecz." Where it's at, 46 BROoKLYN L REv. 389,
392 (1980).
106. The Supreme Court declared in 1972 that "above all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter or its content." Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95 (1972). (An ordinance prohibiting picketing near schools was held invalid
because it allowed labor union pickets and was not content-neutral.) Since that
sweeping declaration the Court has nevertheless upheld laws that regulate the loca-
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controlling content (unless the message is demonstrably
false), but for the purpose of determining the nature of the lis-
teners' interest in the message.
Functional analysis of commercial speech requires an ac-
knowledgement that some permissible means of content evalu-
ation exists. One possible criteria for such content evaluation
is the utility of such content to consumers. If commercial
speech content can be classified on the basis of the consumer's
use of that content, then government regulation can be cali-
brated to serve the interest of the consumer first. Whatever
governmental interest remains may be evaluated and weighed
after the public interest is ascertained. Content-based analysis
is used not to censor ideas but to identify the elements of com-
mercial speech which require protection and the elements
which may be regulated.
The Court in Central Hudson announced what is in effect a
balancing test designed to subject commercial speech regula-
tion to a standard of review which is less stringent than the
strict scrutiny test. To withstand constitutional challenge, the
government must show that the content-based regulation
serves important government objectives and is substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives. 10 7 In order to
apply this test, the content of the speech must be analyzed and
two distinct content-based classifications delineated. First, the
speech must be identified as commercial, a determination
based on content. Second, if the speech is commercial, the
message must again be analyzed to determine whether the
content is false or misleading. In Virginia Pharmacy, Justice
Stewart declared that the extension of first amendment protec-
tion to commercial speech "calls into immediate question the
constitutional legitimacy of every state and federal law regulat-
ing false or deceptive advertising."'1 8 This departure from
tion of adult theatres, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plural-
ity opinion); control "indecent" speech in radio broadcasts, deter misleading
advertisers, Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); and ban political posters from public
buses. The discrepancy between theory and practice has not gone unnoticed. Farber,
Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727
(1980).
Content neutrality is grounded in the determination that the government should not
exercise its power to suppress any particular viewpoint or impose its own position on
an issue. Where commercial speech is involved the government interest tends not to
be political but rather concerns public education and consumer protection.
107. 447 U.S. at 566.
108. 425 U.S. at 776 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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traditional first amendment content-neutrality has been justi-
fied on the basis of the "subordinate position in the scale of
First Amendment values"'1 9 held by commercial speech. The
Court has stated that the content of a particular advertisement
determines the extent of its first amendment protection. 1 0
Content analysis is therefore permissible only where it is
used to identify the aspects of the speech which serve the val-
ues of the first amendment. Content neutrality is preserved as
a value in that only content determined to be antithetical to the
values of the first amendment is regulated.
Functional analysis is therefore in one sense content analy-
sis. The focus is not, however, on the content of the speech but
on the listener's interest in that speech and the purpose served
by the advertisement. If the listener's interest is great, then
the protection afforded the speech should be equally compre-
hensive. Only when the listener's interest can be shown to be
better served by regulation will the first amendment's protec-
tion be lessened to permit the regulation. Two types of listener
interest may exist: a need for intellectual stimulation, or a
need for the objective information contained in the
communication.
To understand the full scope of listener interest, the function
and nature of advertising messages must be examined. Listen-
ers may use advertising messages in numerous ways. Adver-
tising content, however, falls into two major categories. The
first is inherently verifiable statements; assertions that may be
shown to be either true or false. The second category is inher-
ently unverifiable statements. Any speech, commercial or
otherwise, which is inherently unverifiable falls within the pro-
tection of the first amendment until the governmental body at-
tempting to regulate it can demonstrate one of two things.
First, the regulating body must show that the message has the
capacity to mislead the consumer under circumstances where
the consumer would be risking substantial physical or eco-
nomic harm; the consumer, thus, has a greater need for protec-
tion from the message than he has need for the information."1
It should be assumed that the consumer needs the information
109. 436 U.S. at 456.
110. 427 U.S. at 68-69 nn. 28-32.
111. The seminal work on the role of advertising in the economy is G. Stigler, Adver-
tising as Information, 64 J. PoL ECON. 213 (1961). Professor Stigler was the recipient
of the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1982.
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until it can be demonstrated that the information is so mislead-
ing as to be harmful. The uniquely vulnerable position of the
potential consumer may create this heightened need for pro-
tection from the information. For example, a person who has
recently been injured may be uniquely vulnerable to direct
mail appeals from lawyers who wish to solicit insurance or tort
claims business. The FTC, for example, determined that per-
sons who are unemployed might be particularly vulnerable to
an advertisement for a truck drivers school that made
promises of employment.
1 1 2
Second, the government must show some other substantial
interest in regulating the noncommunicative impact of the
speech. The traditional time, place and manner standards
should be applied here with the same force as they are applied
to "core" speech cases." 3 If a time, place and manner restric-
tion would not be justified in a traditional first amendment
speech case, is there any ground for finding that it is justified
when the speech is commercial? In summary, the content of
the speech must be analyzed and the listener's use determined
before the tests of governmental interest and overbreadth can
be correctly applied. Functional analysis of commercial
speech enhances the utility of the first part of the Central Hud-
son test by providing a means of ascertaining the listener's in-
terest, and then comparing that to the governmental interest.
Functional analysis shifts the focus from the legislative pur-
pose to the nature of the advertising message. Because of the
great diversity of advertising messages, much more extensive
examination of both speaker and listener interests is neces-
sary in order to justify governmental regulation and satisfy the
first two steps in the four-part Central Hudson test.
B. How Functional Analysis May Provide a Spectrum of Protection
for Commercial Speech
1. Categories of Commercial Speech
The first amendment protects a category of speech desig-
112. Tri-State Driver Training, Inc., 88 F.T.C. 417, 423 (1976). The advertisements
stressed "free placement" and training to fill "immediate openings" which were not in
fact available.
113. TRiBE, supra note 7, at 580-81. See Heffron v. International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 425 U.S. 640 (1981), and Note, Heffron v. International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc.: A Restrictive Constitutional View of the Proselytizing
Rights of Religious Organizations, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 519 (1982).
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nated as commercial speech. That category is not homogene-
ous but contains several types of messages; these are
determined by the content of the message. The degree of pro-
tection to be given to these varieties of commercial speech and
under what circumstances is largely unexplored. In order to
discover what, if any, first amendment values are served by a
particular advertising message, the nature and function of that
message must be examined. The process of analysis proposed
here starts with the assumption that the speech is protected
and then establishes criteria for justifying exclusion from pro-
tection. Thus, if the message is verifiable and true it will be
protected. If it is verifiable and false it will not. If it is inher-
ently unverifiable, further analysis will reveal whether the ob-
jective attributes serve first amendment values and therefore
require protection, or harm listeners so as to justify regulation.
The following analysis of commercial speech requires that
certain distinctions be drawn between various types of
messages conveyed. The basis for those distinctions is the
substance of the commercial message. Neither the intended
audience nor the intended result of the speech is considered.
This analytical framework permits only an analysis of the lan-
guage employed to convey the commercial message.
Categorization has enjoyed special prominence in legal rea-
soning because of the need to identify types of conduct to
which certain rules apply. As one first amendment scholar
noted: "Without categories there could be no rules.""' 4 While
commercial speech has been recognized as a category of first
amendment speech, the Court has yet to fine tune this observa-
tion and recognize that varieties of messages exist which con-
stitute subspecies of commercial speech.
"Categorization" is a technique that has been used, as an al-
ternative to a "balancing" test"' for analyzing free speech is-
sues. In addition, "categorization" has been used in theoretical
construction in several different ways and has thus become
ambiguous." 6 This analytical process is based solely on the
dictionary definition of the word "category"" 7 and relies upon
114. Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND.
L. REV. 265 (1981).
115. TRIBE, supra note 7, at 582-84. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, 110-114
where it is demonstrated that the categorization and balancing approaches may be
consistent and complementary.
116. Schauer, supra note 114, at 266.
117. "A classificatory division in any field of knowledge, as a phylum or any of its
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no prior use of the term in first amendment theory. Functional
analysis assumes first that all commercial speech is protected
by the first amendment. It then analyzes and defines varieties
of speech that differ in their nature, function and degree of pro-
tection they are accorded. All of these varieties are similar in
that they remain part of the universe of commercial speech.
Some varieties may have such pernicious attributes that they
will merit little constitutional protection and will thus permit
substantial regulation. Analysis of the substance of the speech
is the starting point." 8
The origins of modern first amendment doctrine are gener-
ally thought to be found in cases involving agitation against
United States participation in World War I. Mr. Justice
Holmes formulated the "clear and present danger" test in a
1919 case, Schenck v. United States."9 Schenck was the
Supreme Court's first encounter with first amendment
problems. The Court looked at the tendency of the speech to
cause harmful or forbidden consequences. 2 °
Two years before Schenck, District Judge Learned Hand de-
cided Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten,'2' holding that the
World War I Espionage Act would not be invoked to ban a radi-
cal magazine called The Masses. The first amendment values
articulated in that decision required a "hard," "objective" test
focusing on the precise words rather than on the natural and
probable consequences of the words. 122 If the languge directly
incited illegal action it could be proscribed, and if not, it was
protected.123 The substance analysis advocated by Judge Hand
eliminated the necessity for judges or jurors to make predic-
tions about the likely consequences of words.
The same analytic framework is herein applied to commer-
cial speech regulation. While there may be no "false ideas" in
the political realm, the commercial sphere does contain factual
and nonfactual representations. By adopting Judge Hand's ap-
proach of first analyzing the substance of the speech, subspe-
subdivisions in biology." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
233 (1973).
118. See discussion re content neutral regulations infra.
119. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
120. Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine:
Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 720, 725 (1975).
121. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
122. 244 F. at 542.
123. See Gunther, supra note 120, at 721.
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cies of commercial speech will be discovered which either
merit protection or which require regulation.
The response which advertising seeks to elicit from the lis-
tener is almost always the same-the act of purchasing the
goods or services. The critical element of substance analysis,
in this context, is the type of information conveyed in order to
sell the particular goods or services. In addition, any given lis-
tener's need for information will be affected by the type of
product as well as by the type of representation made about
the product. The following formula for establishing subspecies
of commercial speech incorporates an analysis of both the sub-
stance of the information and the nature of services or goods
being promoted. As noted above, the substance of advertising
messages can be divided into two major types: messages
which can be verified and messages which are not capable of
verification. This second category encompasses appeals based
on representations which are not subject to objective stan-
dards. This tradition in advertising, known as "puffery," has
become an accepted means for promotion of products.
124
Within the first category of verifiable messages, three subdi-
visions are suggested: (1) statements which are true, (2) state-
ments which are demonstrably false, and (3) statements of fact
which are debatable (i.e., subjects about which experts may
differ because studies have yielded different results). This
third subdivision is factual in nature even though the facts may
be in dispute and substantiation must await further scientific
testing.125 An example is the assertion that use of a mouth
wash will prevent colds or lessen their severity.
In some instances, the importance, interpretation and appli-
cation of those facts may be subject to dispute even though the
facts alone can be ascertained. For example, the amount of
nicotine in a cigarette can be measured and accurately re-
ported to the potential consumer. A statement made about
nicotine content in an advertisement for a cigarette is either an
accurate account of the amount of nicotine it contains or it is
inaccurate. The consumer may not have the ability to ascer-
tain the accuracy of the statement but it can be substantiated.
124. I. PRESTON, THE GREAT AMERICAN BLow-up: PUFFERY IN ADVERTISING 6 (1975).
125. See, e.g., National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89 (1976), afd 570 F.2d
157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978). The advertiser was permitted to
continue claiming that there is no relationship between dietary cholesterol and heart
disease as long as it also disclosed the scientific evidence linking the two.
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The experts may differ as to what the effect of smoking such a
cigarette will be on the consumer. The various opinions of
these experts may also be reported in the advertisement.
Thus, the particular advertisement may contain a factual state-
ment that is true yet at the same time, a debatable statement.
An example is the statement "Experts agree that our 1% nico-
tine cigarette is better for you than any other brand."
Within the first category, the need for regulation is clear. Be-
cause consumers do not always possess the means for testing
the product claims made in advertisements, some regulatory
authority must protect consumers against the cost and possi-
ble damage false information may cause. While truthful com-
mercial speech cannot be regulated, some determination that
the speech is in fact truthful must initially be made. In the
subspecies of debatable statements, regulation needs to be
structured to coincide with the consumers' need for independ-
ent testing and assessment. Providing full factual information
on the many sides of current consumer issues is a desirable
but potentially impossible task. Placing some responsibility
upon consumers for decisions which do not have the potential
for significant physical or economic harm seems justified. The
consumer's need is for full and fair reporting of information,
not suppression of facts, interpretations and opinions.
The category of inherently unverifiable statements imparts
little if any factual information but seeks to create an aware-
ness in the consumer, sometimes termed brand identification.
Such messages may attempt to persuade or to arouse curiosity
about the product. If the public is told that a certain cigarette
"tastes good like a cigarette should," those who do not smoke
would probably doubt the assertion since to them no cigarette
tastes good. To a smoker the statement might be more persua-
sive. Nevertheless, taste in cigarettes, as in a great many other
things, is a matter of individual preference and cannot be ob-
jectively verified. The assertion being made is clear although
objectively unverifiable. The substance of the message can
only be verified subjectively by the individual consumer. This
is a variety of commercial speech that should be protected not
because it is true, but because it is neither true nor false and
no objective harm can be attributed to the language.
The function of the cigarette advertisement is to acquaint
the reader or listener with the fact that this brand exists rather
than to convey factual information about the product. The rep-
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resentation is that someone interested in taste in cigarettes
should try this brand. Thus, the listener may use the informa-
tion in the advertisement as a means of becoming acquainted
with the brand of cigarettes but probably will not accept the
claim as truthful or even as intended to be truthful. This is an
example of a clear, not misleading, but unverifiable statement,
which falls within the category of protected commercial
speech.
Other types of unverifiable statements may be both unverifi-
able and misleading. Several years ago a certain vodka adver-
tisement represented that the product would "leave you
breathless.'126 The surface import of the words was that a con-
sumer would be surprised and delighted with the product. The
double entendre suggested that the presence of alcohol would
not be detected on the breath. Whether alcohol consumption
is evident from one's breath is a matter of individual body
chemistry, the amount of alcohol consumed, in what mixture
and over what period of time. Relative to other types of drinks,
straight vodka may not be as noticeable on the breath, but the
representation of breathlessness may be more than a play on
words. It may mislead the person who hopes the boss will not
detect the consumption of a three martini lunch if the martinis
are made with this brand. How grave is the potential to mis-
lead the gullible employee? Should the regulatory powers of
the government be invoked to impose restrictions in this situa-
tion? The functional analysis of the message would mandate
protected status for this message. The potential harm to some
consumers does not outweigh the interest all consumers may
have in the basic information contained in the advertisement-
this product is for sale. As in the cigarette advertisement, this
message will be perceived by most listeners as an invitation to
try the product, not as a warranty of its performance.
Finally, some unverifiable statements are manipulative or
overreaching in the extreme. This type of representation tends
to result in uninformed acquiescence in the consumer. The
statements are not only impossible to substantiate, but are so
extremely deceptive that the need for protection exceeds the
need for information. The capacity for deception or harm to
the consumer may exist because of the unique vulnerability of
the consumer rather than because of any particular attribute of
126. The Heublein Company owns Smirnoff Vodka and employed The Marschalt
Co., Inc. to create this campaign.
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the product or service. Regulation of these types of advertising
techniques may be necessary if the potential for harm to the
consumer is too great. For example, the Court recognized that
the regulation of professional advertising techniques may be
constitutionally justified in order to protect the consumer as
well as the profession.
127
A lawyer who advertises that she was first in her class at
Harvard Law School makes a statement that can be verified. It
may nevertheless be misleading to the consumer who expects
that a lawyer of such academic excellence cannot lose a case.
Another lawyer may advertise that he has won ninety-nine
percent of the cases he has argued in the past ten years. This
is also a statement capable of verification but it cannot be as
easily verified as that of the first lawyer. The consumer may be
misled by this statement into believing that hiring the second
attorney is a guarantee that he will prevail in court. Because of
the perceived vulnerability of the public, state bar associations
may regulate this type of truthful advertising in a way that con-
stitutes a prior restraint. A third lawyer simply advertises that
"Next time you need counsel, try the attorney who cares."
This representation may or may not be true at a given moment
and is unverifiable, because it depends on a subjective con-
sumer response. It may be misleading because the kind of car-
ing it promises is so vague. It could be interpreted as
manipulative if it is posted in a hospital emergency ward or
mailed to unsuccessful traffic court defendants. The need for
regulation of such vague statements is probably minimal.
Once these substantive divisions are delineated, the impor-
tance of these various representations to consumers must be
analyzed. Restriction of commercial speech must be justified
on the basis of the needs of the listener. The fundamental
question is whether the regulation is consistent with the func-
tion of the various types of commercial messages. Does the
regulation accomplish a stated purpose?
2. Illustrations of Functional Analysis
The decision in Youngs Drug Products Corp. v. Bolger128 il-
lustrates the need to analyze the function of an advertising
message. The role of information in advertising must be recon-
127. Bates, 433 U.S. at 364-66.
128. 526 F. Supp. 823 (D.D.C. 1981).
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ciled with the tests for commercial speech regulation articu-
lated by the Supreme Court. 2 9 Youngs Drug, which
manufactures, sells and distributes contraceptive products, de-
veloped a series of informational flyers to be mailed, unsolic-
ited, to the public. The proposed campaign violated the
express language of 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e) 130 and the Postal Regu-
129. 51 U.S.L.W. 4961 (1983). On June 24, 1983 the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the District Court decision holding 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e) (2) unconstitutional be-
cause it violated the first amendment. The statute's absolute ban was held to be more
extensive than necessary to meet the interests asserted by the government. The ma-
jority opinion, written by Justice Marshall, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justices
White, Blackmun and Powell, focused on the "marginal degree of protection ...
achieved by purging all mailboxes of unsolicited material that is entirely suitable for
adults. We have previously made clear that a restriction of this scope is more exten-
sive than the Constitution permits . .. [citing Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383
(1957)]. The level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that
which would be suitable for a sandbox." 51 U.S.L.W. at 4965. The concurring opinion of
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor emphasized the substantiality of the
governmental interest while agreeing that the restriction was "somewhat more exten-
sive than is necessary to serve those interests." 51 U.S.L.W. at 4966. In Justice Stevens
concurrence the question of classifying communications as commercial speech was
examined. The conclusion in Part I of that opinion recognizes the functional aspect of
the speech being regulated.
Because significant speech so often comprises both commercial and non-com-
mercial elements, it may be more fruitful to focus on the nature of the chal-
lenged regulation rather than the proper label for the communication....
Any legitimate interests the statute may serve are unrelated to the prevention
of harm to participants in commercial exchanges. Thus, because it restricts
speech by the appellee that has a significant noncommercial component, I
have scrutinized this statute in the same manner as I would scrutinize a prohi-
bition on unsolicited mailings by an organization with absolutely no commer-
cial interest in the subject.
51 U.S.L.W. at 4967. Justice Brennan took no part in the decision of the case.
130. 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e) reads in full:
(1) Any matter which is unsolicited by the addressee and which is designed,
adapted, or intended for preventing conception (except unsolicited sam-
ples thereof mailed to a manufacturer thereof, a dealer therein, a li-
censed physician or surgeon, or a nurse, pharmacist, druggist, hospital, or
clinic) is nonmailable matter, shall not be carried or delivered by mail,
and shall be disposed of as the Postal Service directs.
(2) Any unsolicited advertisement of matter which is designed, adapted, or
intended for preventing conception is nonmailable matter, shall not be
carried or delivered by mail, and shall be disposed of as the Postal Serv-
ice directs unless the advertisement-
(A) is mailed to a manufacturer of such matter, a dealer therein, a
licensed physician or surgeon, or a nurse, pharmacist, druggist, hospital,
or clinic; or
(B) accompanies in the same parcel any unsolicited sample excepted
by paragraph (1) of this subsection.
An advertisement shall not be deemed to be unsolicited for the purposes
of this paragraph if it is contained in a publication for which the ad-
dressee has paid or promised to pay a consideration or which he has
otherwise indicated he desires to receive.
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lations interpreting the statute.131 Youngs Drug challenged
these regulations as violations of the first, fifth and ninth
amendments. 32
The district court, applying the commercial speech test of
Central Hudson,133 reviewed three aspects of the analysis.
First, addressing the substantiality of the governmental inter-
est, the court recognized a substantial governmental interest in
"protecting the privacy of individuals in their homes."'34 Even
though an addressee may prohibit any mailing he deems offen-
sive, 1' the governmental interest was determined to be the
protection of the individual from receiving even one such mail-
ing. 3 6 Second, the court determined that the regulation did di-
rectly advance the governmental interest. Third, the court
found that the regulation was constitutionally impermissible
because it was more extensive than necessary to serve the gov-
ernment interest.137 As in Central Hudson,'138 the government
failed to demonstrate that the need to protect the public from
unsolicited information about contraception could not be ade-
quately met by a more limited regulation. Therefore, the court
determined that since the regulation did not meet the least re-
strictive alternative standard, the multi-item flyer containing
tasteful promotion of contraceptives could be mailed just as if
they did not contain such a promotion. 13  The basis for this
holding was that the government has made an "erroneous as-
sessment of the seriousness of the intrusion" upon the privacy
of the recipient."4 The materials devoted exclusively to pro-
moting the use of contraception were allowed to be mailed un-
solicited, provided warnings about the contents were displayed
prominently on the front of the mailing envelope.1
4
1
The court viewed the controversy as simply an exercise in
131. Domestic Mail Manual 123.434 provides "Unsolicited advertisements for arti-
cles or things which are designed, adapted or intended for preventing conception are
nonmailable, except ... when the mailer has no commercial interest in such item."
132. 526 F. Supp at 825.
133. Id. at 828-30.
134. Id. at 828.
135. 39 U.S.C. § 3008(a). See Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970), uphold-
ing the absolute right of the addressee to prohibit the mailing of offensive, "sexually
provocative" materials to his home.
136. 526 F. Supp. at 828.
137. Id. at 829.
138. 447 U.S. at 570.
139. 526 F. Supp. at 829.




finding the least restrictive alternative to governmental regula-
tion of information deemed by some to be offensive. In assess-
ing the seriousness of the danger to individual privacy, the
court did not analyze how the information was used by recipi-
ents, but accepted the government's assessment of the danger
of harm to sensitive persons. Functional analysis of the adver-
tising message would reveal that the information contained
therein was verifiable and true. Regulation of accurate com-
mercial speech is permitted only when the government can
demonstrate that receipt of accurate information would be
harmful.
Determining what is offensive should be, in the first instance,
the privilege of the recipient. The mechanism to exercise such
individual choice exists in the postal regulation which permits
recipients to forbid future mailings. The function of the adver-
tising message is to provide a list of products and their prices.
The advertisement may also have the effect of introducing the
recipient to health and hygiene information. Some recipients
may not wish to receive such information in the future and
may stop such mailings. Others may benefit from the informa-
tion. The risk of harm must be balanced against the potential
benefits inherent in the free flow of accurate information.
The government determined that if such material would fall
into the hands of inquisitive children, harm would result. The
court made no independent assessment of this concern but as-
serted that its required warnings would reduce, though not to
zero,'42 this problem. The protection of children from informa-
tion they might not need or understand is a complex, private
issue for family determination and is not, in this situation, ca-
pable of adequate or effective government control. The court
did not consider the potential for beneficial use of accurate
information.
143
Viewed in terms of the Central Hudson test, the court deter-
mined that the message was commercial speech which was
neither false nor misleading. The analysis focused on the sec-
ond step, i.e., whether the government had a substantial inter-
142. Id. at 831.
143. In 1973 a three judge court invalidated the same statute in Associated Students
v. Attorney General, 368 F. Supp. 11 (C.D. Cal. 1973), on the grounds that it denied to
many potential recipients knowledge, otherwise lacking, which would allow them to
make informed decisions. The definition of advertisement was not broad enough to
include material expression, an opinion on social policy, and family planning.
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est which justified the regulation. The court failed to grasp the
connection between the validity of the regulatory purpose, the
nature of the message and the utility of the information to the
recipient. Functional analysis would have provided that link.
The court reached the correct result by analyzing only one of
two vital components-the government's interest. The lis-
tener's or recipient's interest was not considered. The gravity
of the governmental interest expressed in regulating speech
can be assessed only in comparison to the opposing interest
the listener may have in the unfettered stream of communica-
tion. Functional analysis of the speech in question here would
have revealed a category of speech, verifiable and accurate,
that requires the highest degree of first amendment protection.
Therefore, the governmental interest in restricting the flow of
accurate information would have to be demonstrably compel-
ling and would have to serve other more important interests of
the recipients.
Offensive speech," or speech that the government has de-
termined might offend some listeners, was the underlying is-
sue in the recent Supreme Court of Nevada decision in
Princess Sea Industries, Inc. v. Nevada."' A state statute
banned advertising of legal brothels "anywhere in any county,
city or town where prostitution is prohibited by local ordi-
nance."'146 The statute was challenged by the owners of a legal
brothel and two newspapers who sought the Constitution's
protection for the advertisement of a legal business.147 The
facts of this case closely parallel those of Bigelow v. Vir-
ginia,148 which involved the advertisement for abortion serv-
144. It is not, however, the cases in which the auditor is in agreement with that
which is being expressed which reach the courts under the rubric of the First
Amendment. Distaste for what is being expressed, and often absolute revul-
sion, appear to be the hallmarks of the exercise of First Amendment rights and
probably are the necessary contexts in which the preservation of those rights
can be firmly assured.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Bowen, 600 F.2d 667, 671 (7th Cir.
1979).
145. 635 P.2d 281 (Nev. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982).
146. NRS. 201.430(2) details certain specific information sought to be proscribed
from distribution to the public, i.e.: "Inclusion in any display, handbill or pub-
lication of the address, location or telephone number of a house of prostitution
or of identification of a means of transportation to such a house, or of direc-
tions telling how to obtain any such information, constitutes prima facie evi-
dence of advertising for the purposes of this section."
147. 635 P.2d at 284.
148. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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ices. Upholding the prohibition, the Nevada court drew a
distinction between the Bigelow ordinance and the Nevada
statute based on the nature of the service being advertised.
Bigelow involved an advertising ban directed at medical serv-
ices, legal where performed, which had been accorded consti-
tutional protections based on the right of privacy.
The court construed Bigelow too narrowly. The Bigelow
holding was not based on the nature of the service being adver-
tised, but on the nature of the information imparted by the
speech that the state sought to regulate. The fact that some
persons might be offended by that message was not considered
in Bigelow. The fact that abortion is a controversial subject of
interest to the public was considered significant.
The Supreme Court, in Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional,'49 clarified the range of protection afforded speech that
some may find offensive. The Court struck down a state ban on
the distribution of nonmedical contraceptives except through
licensed pharmacists, stating that "[T]he fact that protected
speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppres-
sion."'1 0 The Supreme Court of Nevada did not discuss Carey
and did not acknowledge that a regulation of protected speech
had to meet the requirements of Central Hudson.
Application of the first two parts of the four part Central
Hudson test, amplified by functional analysis of the speech,
achieves not only a different result but a clearer expression of
the first amendment values at issue. The advertisement in
Princess Sea was commercial in nature because it proposed a
commercial transaction. The advertisement was not alleged to
be either false or misleading. The Nevada court did not ex-
amine the message content, 15 1 the utility of the message or the
purpose for the state statute. Thus, neither the first nor the
second steps in the Central Hudson test were applied. If they
had been, one can speculate that the information in the adver-
149. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
150. Id. at 701.
151. In his concurrence, however, Justice Manovkian expressed the belief that this
advertisement was one which posed no more than a simple commercial transaction
and was markedly different than an advertisement containing factual material of clear
public interest. He found that the speech at issue might be equated with a mere solici-
tation of patronage implicit in a trade name, citing Friedman v. Rogers. The concur-
ring opinion states that "nothing precludes the state from completely proscribing
speech concerning this deleterious activity in [a] county where prostitution is illegal."
635 P.2d at 287.
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tisement would have been found to be truthful and the as-
serted government interest would have been the potential
offense readers might experience upon seeing the
advertisement.
The message in the advertisement would serve to tell the
reader something he already knows, i.e., that prostitution is a
licensed business in some counties in Nevada. The purpose for
licensing prostitution was the interest of the State in preserv-
ing the public health.'52 Presumably, the informed consumer
will further the purpose of the licensing regulation by patroniz-
ing establishments that are licensed, and are therefore less
likely to pose a health hazard. The governmental interest in
regulating this speech would seem to be in assuring accurate,
comprehensive information about where the activity is legal
and therefore safer. The state's interest in suppressing infor-
mation transmission in all but the counties where prostitution
is allowed is difficult to discern.
In his concurring opinion in Princess Sea, Justice Manovkian
asserted that the legislature has the right, indeed the responsi-
bility, to determine that community standards and mores may
differ from one community to another. Thus, it may adopt a
regulation to meet prevailing conditions. The Justice viewed
the regulation as an application of contemporary community
standards, in the same manner as such standards are applied
in the regulation of obscenity.
This analysis overlooks the point that in newspaper advertis-
ing the advertiser is not entitled to open access to all forms of
media. The decision to advertise belongs not only to the adver-
tiser but also to the owner of the media in question.
53 Com-
munity standards may be expressed by regulating the place
152. Although the court does not discuss the history of legalized prostitution in Ne-
vada, the most frequently stated purpose for legalization is promotion of public health
by preventing venereal disease. See Note, Decriminalization of Prostitution: The Lim-
its of the Criminal Law, 55 ORE. L. REV. 553 (1976); Milman, New Rules for the Oldest
Profession: Should We Change our Prostitution Laws? 3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1980);
Note, A Proposalfor the Legalization of Prostitution in Connecticut, 49 CONN. B.J. 163
(1975).
153. Media managers may generally refuse any advertising they deem inappropri-
ate for their particular form of communication. See Newspaper Printing v. Galbreath,
580 S.W.2d 777 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979), in which the court denied in-
junctive relief against a newspaper for refusal to print ads which contained abbrevia-
tions. See also Adult Film Association of America v. Times Mirror Co., 3 Med. L. Rptr.
2292, Civ. Action No. C217216 (L.A. County Super. Ct. 1978), in which the court affirmed
a newspaper's right not to print advertisements for sexually oriented films.
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and manner of advertising. Discussions with the editor and
the owner of the newspaper would be appropriate. Statewide
legislation prohibiting an advertisement because community
standards may be offended sweeps too broadly. Neither the
state interest in public health nor the community interest in
preserving local mores is served. In summary, functional anal-
ysis of the communication sought to be prohibited reveals a
truthful and accurate message which may serve to inform the
public about a controversial subject and that may aid the pres-
ervation of public health. The harm inherent in the speech has
not been demonstrated. Therefore, the regulation should not
have been upheld.
In Ad World, Inc. v. Doylestown,5 a local regulation prohib-
iting the unsolicited distribution of advertising circulars was
declared unconstitutional. The decision rested on a distinction
between commercial and noncommercial speech that begs the
question of what values are served by the first amendment.
The stated purpose of the ordinance was to restrict door to
door distribution of advertising materials because it created
hazardous conditions, constituted an invasion of privacy and
could become an open invitation to vandalism or burglary if
papers were allowed to collect for several days on an absent
homeowner's doorstep. 15 The ordinance therefore made it un-
lawful to place material at the residence, on the property or in
the mailbox of a person owning a home in the township unless
the occupant of the residence affirmatively requested
distribution.
The court decided that the speech in Ad World constituted
noncommercial speech because it locally performed functions
which are generally undertaken by larger metropolitan or re-
gional newspapers, 56 spreading general information, and pro-
viding a medium for advertising. The court took judicial notice
of the fact that this paper was accepted as a newspaper rather
154. 672 F.2d 1136 (3rd Cir. 1982). Ad World consisted almost entirely of advertising
with a few pages of consumer and community information, notices of community
events and announcements covering local communities and neighborhoods. This
weekly was distributed without charge to every home in the area by local carriers who
would attach the paper contained in a plastic bag to a mailbox hook or a doorknob or
leave it someplace on the premises. The policy of the paper was to stop delivery if a
resident so requested, but the paper did not initially seek the homeowners' consent for
delivery.
155. Id. at 1138.
156. Id. at 1139. The ratio of news and editorial items to advertising was found to be
comparable to metropolitan newspapers.
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than as a mere advertising circular in the Doylestown commu-
nity since only 50 out of 3,000 households had requested that it
not be delivered.
15 7
The court undertook what is, in effect, a functional analysis
of the speech in question. It based its decision upon the utility
of the information to the listeners while balancing the state in-
terest served by the regulation against the need for unfettered
communication. The court confounded this analysis, however,
by applying the labels commercial and noncommerical. The
court relied upon its determination that the noncommercial
speech contained in this publication was sufficiently important
to justify carrying along with it the protection of the commer-
cial messages. 58 This distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech, coupled with the court's failure to de-
tail the constitutional purposes both types of messages serve,
creates an artificial and unnecessary distinction, notwithstand-
ing the fact that the outcome is consistent with the proper ap-
plication of constitutional standards. 9 It would have been
sufficient to note that both the editorial, and the advertising
components of the paper serve important economic and infor-
mational needs of the recipients.
A virtue of analyzing the function of commercial speech is it
amplifies both steps one and two of the Central Hudson test.
For example, in John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell,6 ° the First
Circuit examined a Maine statute'6 ' which abolished highway
157. Id. at 1140. The court determined that the publication as a whole served the
economic interest of both the listener and the speaker. Even if this publication had
contained only a few articles the court would have viewed it as qualitatively different
from an advertising leaflet because it created a forum in which advertisers compete for
a consumer's attention. As it was conceded that there was sufficient noncommercial
material deserving of full first amendment protection, the court did not need to reach
the question of how much protection would be required in the absence of such edito-
rial material.
158. Id. at 1140.
159. The court applied the four part Central Hudson test and determined that even
if some of the speech was commercial the regulation was not drawn with the precision
necessary to protect the stated government interest in preventing crime and disposing
of litter. The court determined that the regulation could not be viewed as a noncontent
based, and reasonable time and place regulation because the ordinance was not drawn
with the necessary precision. An essential characteristic of any acceptable time, place
and manner regulation is that it must leave adequate alternative methods of communi-
cation. The court suggested that alternative methods of communication were available
which might justify the restriction of purely commercial speech. Here the ordinance
restricted both commercial and noncommercial speech and was therefore too broad.
160. 639 F.2d 6 (lst Cir. 1980).
161. The Maine Traveler Information Services Act, 23 M.R.S.A. §§ 1901 et. seq. ironi-
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billboards in an effort to promote aesthetic values. The court
applied the first step of the Central Hudson test, asking
whether the content of the billboard messages was commer-
cial, potentially political or otherwise in the public interest.
162
The speech functions curtailed were wide-ranging. The regula-
tion was not aimed at the content, however, as it would have
abolished all messages in a given media. 163 Step two requires
an analysis of the substantiality of the governmental reason for
the regulation. The state argued that its purpose, promoting
public safety, aesthetics, and economic development, was suffi-
cient to justify the regulation. In such situations, the balance
between the regulator's concerns and the free speech position
is struck by considering both the nature of the messages and
the need for the regulation. Unless a complete functional anal-
ysis is made of the information and ideas that would be cur-
tailed by the regulation, adequate balancing of the
governmental interest is not possible.
The Donnelly court did not focus upon the value of the com-
mercial speech being curtailed" but based its holding upon
the broad sweep of the statute. 165 The court applied the fourth
step in the Central Hudson test finding that the regulation was
too broad in one respect because it prohibited all forms of first
amendment speech, core and commercial. It also found that
the statute was not tailored precisely enough to meet the
stated purpose because it allowed exceptions such as on-prem-
ises business advertisement and essential commercial commu-
nications. The state failed to show that its interests could not
be served by less restrictive means. The balance may have
been appropriately struck here, but all the elements essential
to the balancing process were not considered. The concurring
cally would reduce materially the amount and variety of information available to trav-
elers. See 639 F.2d at 16-19, Pettine, J., concurring.
162. 639 F.2d at 8.
163. The court explored the validity of the statute as a time, place and manner re-
striction. Id. at 8. While the statute had some of the requisite features in that it did not
refer to content of the advertisement, some of the exceptions were based on content.
The court accurately assessed its task: "[W]e must evaluate not only the importance
of the state's interests, but also the extent to which these restrictions further those
interests . . . ." Id.
164. "To summarize, where commercial speech is concerned we would have little
reservation in holding that the statute directly serves legitimate state interests and
* . .that these interests could not be served as well by a more limited restriction on
commercial speech." Id. at 15.
165. Id. at 16.
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opinion conveys a more sophisticated exposition of the values
served by commercial speech.166 It addressed the gravity of
the balancing endeavor.
If any one, consistent thread runs through First Amend-
ment jurisprudence, surely it must be the recognition that the
preservation of free expression is neither easy nor comfortable.
It often requires of us that we tolerate things we would rather
not see and endure things we would rather not hear. It re-
quires that we accept a less-than-perfect world-a world that is
not as quiet, as neat, as refined, or even, I believe, as scenic as
we might like.'
67
These cases reveal the great diversity of situations in which
regulation of commercial speech is tested.168 Traffic and safety
ordinances, 169  billboard cases, 170  professional advertising
cases' 7 1 and public display and performance ordinances 72 are
all a part of the growing array of advertising jurisprudence. It
is essential that the fundamental interests of both advertisers
and audience are adequately recognized and explored in these
decisions. The test prescribed by Central Hudson provides a
166. Id. at 21-22.
167. Id. at 23-24. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court was unable to constitute
a majority opinion in its consideration of a similar ordinance in Metromedia Inc. v. San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). The court in a plurality opinion struck down the billboard
ordinance because it impermissibly restricted messages based on their content. See,
Comment, Standard of Review for Regulations of Commercial Speech: Metromedia
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 66 MiNN. L. REv. 903 (1982).
168. See, e.g., Weiler v. Carpenter, 507 F. Supp. 837 (D.N.M. 1981) holding a drug
paraphenalia law too extensive under Central Hudson test. "IT] he interest of the citi-
zenry in receiving information about drug paraphenalia must be matched against Clo-
vis' interest in preventing the sale of drug paraphenalia within its city limits." Id. at
844; Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1981) using the
Supreme Court's Central Hudson test as a guideline.
169. See, e.g., E.B. Elliott Advertising Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County 425 F.2d 1141
(5th Cir. 1970) cert. dismissed, 400 U.S. 805 (1970); Lakewood v. Colfax Unlimited Ass'n,
Inc., 634 P.2d 52 (Colo. 1981); State v. Pile, 603 P.2d 337 (Okla. 1979) cert. denied 453 U.S.
922 (1980).
170. See, e.g., Lotze v. Washington, 444 U.S. 921 (1979); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising
Co. v. Hulse, 439 U.S. 808 (1978); J. Donnelly & Sons v. Maller, 453 F. Supp. 1272 (1978).
171. See In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Board of Optometry of Calif. v. California Citi-
zen's Action Group, 426 U.S. 916 (1976); Baker v. Registered Dentists of Okla., 543 F.
Supp. 1177 (W.D. Okla. 1982); Bishop v. Iowa State Bar Assoc., 521 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D.
Iowa 1981); Davis v. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 497 F. Supp. 525 (D.N.J. 1980); and Bol-
ton v. Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts, 473 F. Supp. 728 (D. Kan. 1979).
172. See Tacynec v. Philadelphia, 687 F.2d 793 (3rd Cir. 1982) (constitutionality of
rules limiting number of bands performing in parade); Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Con-
sciousness v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430 (2nd Cir. 1981) (New York state "booth" rule requir-
ing funds solicititation at state fair to be conducted in booth).
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structured process of inquiry that requires a functional analy-
sis of the speech in question to achieve a thorough airing of all




The recent inclusion of commercial speech in the realm of
first amendment protection has created a need for a standard
for determining when advertising may be regulated. Tradi-
tional free speech doctrine has not evolved an analytical
method for effecting a full exploration of the free speech values
served by commercial speech. This article suggests an ap-
proach that requires an objective analysis of the function of the
commercial speech to be regulated. Functional analysis is
founded upon the value of individual self-expression; it pro-
ceeds from the assumption that commercial speech is pro-
tected until it can be demonstrated that the manner of
presentation or the content justifies regulation. Such justifica-
tion must be based on a showing that the speech serves none
of the values of the first amendment. This article suggests that
these values go beyond the assurance of the free flow of accu-
rate commercial information 174 to include a broad opportunity
for the listener to make judgments and analyze the message
conveyed.
The four part test of Central Hudson would permit, but does
not require, a functional analysis of the advertising message.
The process of evaluating the function of commercial speech
should be included in that test in order to clarify and enrich
the meaning of the first amendment protection. By illuminat-
ing the decision-making process, functional analysis of adver-
tising messages promotes open inquiry into matters of concern
which go beyond traditional political speech.
The process of functional analysis is illustrated in FTC and
lower court decisions which extend or deny protection to com-
mercial speech. The purpose and scope of regulation must be
balanced against the objective information provided, the use to
which the listener puts the message and the risks incurred by
the listener in evaluating the information. Without a standard
173. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948).
174. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84.
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for evaluating the message, whether its function is to inform or
to persuade or both, the meaning of the constitutional guaran-
tee of free speech is distorted. Adequate standards for the bal-
ancing of interests are needed to assure full protection'of first
amendment values. Functional analysis of commercial speech
is a necessary first step in the development of such standards.
